
Convoy 678N Engagement Green Tab AAR





1075th Medium Truck









"Heavy Lift" Contract



"White Trucks"



Heavy Lift" Contract Driver





518th Gun Truck Company 🖥



Level 2 HMMWV Gun Trucks Escorts





617th MP Co Shadowing AFEES Convoy








Enemy Situation



Estimated forty to fifty insurgents set up a complex ambush to cause US casualties with the possible intent to capture US Forces. The ambush included:

- Heavy small arms fire from hasty positions
 - Armor-piercing rounds and sniper weapons augmented attack
- An IED placed in the road median
- Road obstacles
 - A SUV blocked road
 - Median contained a mud ditch which fixed convoy
- Accurate indirect RPG fire, to include the use of the OG7V, with direct hits to trucks
- A ground assault by 10-15 insurgents
- Insurgents captured were carrying handcuffs
- Enemy Losses
 - 26 killed in ambush
 - 7 wounded and 1 unwounded insurgent captured
 - US Forces found 6 RPGs, 16 Rockets, 15 Machine Guns, 22 Assault Rifles, more than 2,900 rounds and 40 hand grenades






Background



 Mission: 1075th TC CO executes Iraqi Express mission to Theater Distribution Center at LSA Anaconda 20 March 2005.

Convoy Organization:

- Convoy Commander SSG Uhl (1075th)
 - 6 x M915/872s
 - 2 x M915 bobtails
 - 3 HMMWV Convoy Escort Platforms
 - 20 x IAP Tractor-Trailer Systems
 - 2 x IAP bobtails




3 HMMWV Convoy Escort Platforms


Chronology

- 19 March: Convoy picks up loads at TDC and arrives at Scania
- 20 March: Convoy departs Scania enroute to LSAA via ASR Kiev/Bismark

1125: Ambush Begins

• 1210: Enemy Neutralized










Battle Chronology



- Convoy Schematic Diagram
- Battlefield sketches
 - Initial Activity
 - Lead Vehicle Advances
 - Bus IED'd
 - CEP moves into Kill Zone
 - Rear of convoy under attack
 - CEP withdrawal
 - RPG Grenade Attack
 - Trucks begin exiting kill zone
 - CEP Advance
 - Convoy receives fire from right side
 - Casualties moved
 - Video clip of casualty being moved
 - KYNG Soldier Recovery

- Casualty recovery
- Convoy moves out
- AT4 fired
- Ground Assault
- KYNG Soldier evacuated
- SPC Hubbard evacuated
- Pictures

1075th Convoy Schematic Diagram





AAFES Convoy Hit in Southbound Lane








Lead Vehicle Advances








Bus IED'd







AAFES Bus Tried to Clear Kill Zone Hit by an IED







Ricketts is Wounded in Leg













Northbound Convoy Blocked








Initial Activity








CEP moves into Kill zone









Rear of convoy under attack













Fire Extinguisher




Regulator 2"





CEP withdrawal








Truck hit by RPG fire







RPG Hit Passenger Side of Ricketts' Truck

















Trucks move out of kill zone





CEP Advance







617th MPs Had Turned Down Access Road








Found Egress Vehicles





Convoy engaged from the right










Casualties moved








KYNG Soldier recovery







617th MP CPP







617th MP CPP








Casualty Recovery








Convoy Moves Out








AT4 fired








Ground Assault






Captured Enemy Weapons





KYNG Soldier Evacuated









SPC Hubbard Evacuated





onsolidation and Reorganization





Key Convoy Personnel



- SSG Uhl (Convoy Commander)
 - Lead convoy 2 miles out of kill zone and set up secure casualty collection point
- PFC Delancey
 - After being struck twice in the helmet by gun fire and RPG, provided suppressive fire in order to keep the gun fire off of his vehicle and his injured co-driver, inflicting 2-6 casualties on insurgents
- SPC Beck
 - Radioed to convoy commander advising him to stay out of kill zone, extracted SGT Ricketts from his truck, and pulled him to a covered position behind another truck while under fire
- SPC Birkel & SPC Sharples
 - Ran 300-400 meters to front of convoy while under fire to recover SGT Ricketts, lifted him into a white truck, got TCN and DoD drivers remounted and out of kill zone
- SGT Brown
 - Became base of fire with a M249 SAW against insurgent ground assault and developed plan to evacuate the wounded KYNG soldier
- SGT Hernandez
 - Applied first aid to wounded KYNG soldier, assisted in repelling the insurgent ground assault, and evacuated the wounded KYNG to the South CCP
- SPC Schrad
 - Provided suppressive fire along with the CEP positioned in the rear and neutralized enemy position, allowing for the recovery of SGT Ricketts



Lessons Learned



- Crew-served weapon malfunctions
 - Discussion: During the firefight, the .50 Cal MGs repeatedly misfired, resulting in secondary weapons (mostly M16s) being used to suppress large numbers of entrenched enemy with limited effect
 - Recommendation: Designated areas where soldiers can test-fire their weapons would enable soldiers to identify and correct deficiencies prior to an engagement
- Lack of AT4s or Mk19s enabled entrenched enemy to suppress convoy movement
 - Discussion: The insurgents were effectively using cover, concealment, and hasty emplacements which small arms fire was not able to penetrate; they were also massing fires from emplacements which an AT4 or Mk19 would have been able to neutralize
 - Recommendation: Convoys need to have either an AT4 or a Mk19 mounted on CEPs
- Convoy Commanders in task vehicles
 - Discussion: Due to a vehicle becoming NMC at Scania, the convoy commander had to couple his bobtail to the NMC vehicle's load. During the firefight, the convoy commander could not move around the battlefield to assess the situation due to the lack of mobility of the M915 tractor-trailor system.
 - Recommendation: Convoy commanders need to have a dedicated command and control vehicle (preferably HMMWVs)
- Intelligence on enemy situation was poor
 - Discussion: The location of the ambush had seen enemy activity for the two days prior to this convoy rolling through. The soldiers were not prepared as they could have been had there been a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield
 - Recommendation: S2 briefs not only need to focus on what has happened but also need to give the convoy commanders a overview of what the enemy might do in a given area.



